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THE CHALLENGE OF ACHIEVING DISCOVERY FROM THIRD 
PARTY, NON-RETAINED EXPERTS 
INTRODUCTION 
There is an almost natural tension between science and litigation, arising 
from the inherent unpleasantness scientists must endure because of the 
demands of litigation.1 Tensions between litigation and science can become 
particularly severe when discovery is directed at a non-party, non-retained 
expert, scientist, or researcher.2 
Consider the following hypothetical: during products liability litigation, the 
plaintiff’s expert takes the stand and testifies the defendant’s product caused 
the plaintiff’s injury. When asked to describe the basis for his opinion, the 
plaintiff’s expert explains how he formed his opinion by relying upon a paper 
published by an independent researcher. The results of the research paper 
explain how the defendant’s product causes the same type of injury suffered by 
the plaintiff. On cross-examination, the defense tries to impeach the 
foundational underpinnings of the expert’s testimony by attacking the merits of 
the research paper the expert relied upon. However, since the expert only 
analyzed the research paper, the defendant’s attorney is unable to identify any 
flaws in the underlying data supporting the independent researcher’s 
conclusions in the paper. Therefore, the defendant is forced to accept the 
research presented as correct and it can be relied upon in the current litigation. 
The jury, accepting the expert’s conclusions and reasoning, awards millions of 
dollars to the plaintiff. 
This hypothetical highlights the need for the defendant’s attorney to 
acquire the information used by the independent researcher. Because the expert 
relied heavily on the independent researcher’s paper when forming an expert 
opinion, the defense can challenge the expert’s opinion by disputing the 
research paper upon which the expert relied. In order to determine if there is a 
basis to dispute the research paper, the defendant needs the underlying data the 
independent researcher used to support the research paper. Once the defense 
obtains the underlying information, the information can be provided to their 
own experts to determine if and how the research paper’s conclusions are 
 
 1. Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Along the Litigation/Science Interface, 57 BROOK. L. 
REV. 381, 382, 384 (1991) (commenting on the suspicion of litigation in the scientific 
community). 
 2. Id. at 394. 
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challengeable. But first, in order to obtain the independent researcher’s 
information, a subpoena must be issued to compel the independent researcher 
to turn over the information because the independent researcher is not a party, 
nor a retained expert to a party.3 
Part I of this paper explains why the general rules regarding experts do not 
address this situation and then discusses a court decision in which the court 
was faced with a researcher in this situation. Part II discusses the 1991 
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a line of three cases that 
show the need for the rule and how, after twenty-five years, the amendments 
have not changed how the courts address this problem. Part III discusses the 
different arguments, both successful and unsuccessful, researchers have made 
to try to resist discovery, both inside and outside the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Finally, Part IV discusses the researcher scholar’s privilege and 
what other changes can be made to better help and protect researchers. 
I.  WHY THE EXPERT DISCOVERY RULES FAIL 
The goal in the hypothetical described above is for the corporation’s 
attorney to gain discovery from the independent researcher in order to 
determine if there is a basis to question the opinions of the expert witness. 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 provides the general rule regarding 
discovery4 and the specific rules regarding discovery from expert witnesses.5 
The expert witness, who was specifically retained by the plaintiff for trial, will 
have to disclose all the facts and data he considered when forming his expert 
opinion.6 This disclosure will include the independent researcher’s report, 
since it helped form the expert’s opinion. However, since the expert witness 
never considered, viewed, or analyzed the underlying data supporting the 
independent researcher’s report, the expert witness cannot disclose that 
information. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only require the disclosure 
of all information considered by the expert.7 Further, the expert witness is 
physically incapable of turning over this information because the information 
has never been in the possession of the expert. Remember, while the expert has 
never seen this underlying information, the information is still critical to the 
expert’s opinion because it was used by the independent researcher in 
developing the report upon which the expert relied. 
 
 3. FED. R. CIV. P. 45. 
 4. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1). 
 5. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2). 
 6. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(ii). Disclosure must be accompanied by a written report if 
the witness is one retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case. FED. R. 
CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B). The report must contain the facts or data considered by the witness when 
forming the witness’s opinions. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(ii). 
 7. Id. 
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Additionally, the corporation’s attorney cannot obtain discovery from the 
independent researcher using Rule 26. Under Rule 26, discovery is only 
available from experts who may testify at trial as witnesses.8 Rule 26 
disclosure from experts does not extend to an expert who has not consented to 
participate in the lawsuit because the rule only applies to facts and opinions 
held by experts acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation.9 The 
independent researcher is not an expert witness retained by the plaintiff or 
otherwise expected to testify. In fact, the independent researcher is not a 
witness because the researcher’s only connection to the case is the researcher’s 
report being used at trial by the expert witness. Thus, the independent 
researcher is a third party to the litigation, and a subpoena is required to 
compel the production of the underlying data in the possession of the 
independent researcher.10 
However, what happens when the independent researcher refuses to 
provide the information and challenges the subpoena? What happens if the 
researcher refuses to become an expert witness to either party and therefore is 
not subject to the required expert disclosure? After all, most scientists would 
prefer to not suffer the demands of litigation and instead keep their distance.11 
Can the party compel the independent researcher to turn over their 
information? Does the party’s need for the information override the fact that 
the subpoenaed researcher is a non-party and has no direct connection to the 
current litigation at hand? 
A. Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons 
The hypothetical situation discussed above is grounded in numerous real 
world examples where parties sought the underlying information supporting an 
independent researcher’s published research.12 One particularly illustrative 
 
 8. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B) (applying to a witness giving expert testimony); FED. R. CIV. 
P. 26(a)(2)(C) (applying to witnesses giving testimony). 
 9. In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. 211, 214–15 (D. Ariz. 1987). 
 10. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a). 
 11. Marcus, supra note 1, at 387. 
 12. Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545, 1546 (11th Cir. 1985) (discussing 
a research center challenging a subpoena seeking the personal information regarding the 
participants used in the center’s Toxic Shock Syndrome study suggesting the syndrome can be 
caused by a specific type of tampon); In re Am. Tobacco Co., 880 F.2d 1520, 1522 (2d Cir. 1989) 
(discussing tobacco companies seeking to compel the underlying data of two studies published by 
a non-party doctor suggesting a person exposed to both tobacco smoke and asbestos have a much 
higher likelihood of developing cancer); In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. at 211–12 (discussing a car 
manufacturer seeking information from an author of a study suggesting certain vehicles are more 
hazardous than others). 
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example is Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons.13 Deitchman brought a 
pharmaceutical products liability action against E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. and 
other drug companies for a disease caused by exposure to the drug 
diethylstilbestrol (DES).14 In connection with the litigation, Squibb issued a 
subpoena for the production of every document in the Registry for Hormonal 
Transplacental Carcinogenesis at the University of Chicago, maintained by Dr. 
Arthur Herbst.15 This registry maintained records on the exact aspects of the 
plaintiff’s disease, a type of cancer called adenocarcinoma.16 Dr. Herbst tried 
to quash the subpoena claiming the information sought was confidential and 
privileged.17 
Dr. Herbst was not a party to the case and would not testify at the trial.18 
His only connection to the case was the publication of a study suggesting an 
association between exposure to the drug DES and the cancer from which the 
plaintiff suffered.19 Dr. Herbst created the registry to determine what caused 
this particular kind of cancer and the best means for treatment.20 In order to 
establish the registry, Dr. Herbst requested medical records of women with this 
type of cancer, with his promise to keep the information confidential, from 
medical schools and hospitals throughout the world.21 Dr. Herbst made these 
requests annually, to continually update the registry’s information and gather 
more information regarding this type of cancer.22 
The court, adopting a balancing standard used to assess disclosure of 
materials between parties, held that when protection from a subpoena is 
sought, the court must employ a balancing test to determine whether the need 
of the party seeking disclosure outweighs the adverse effect such disclosure 
would have on the policies underlying the claimed privilege.23 In this context, 
the court said the nature of Dr. Herbst’s and Squibb’s competing hardships 
must be compared.24 
 
 13. Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 740 F.2d 556, 558 (7th Cir. 1984) (discussing 
drug companies seeking information from a study suggesting an association between cancer and 
the drug diethylstilbestrol). 
 14. Id. at 557. 
 15. Id. at 558. 
 16. Id. at 557–58. 
 17. Id. at 558. 
 18. Deitchman, 740 F.2d at 558. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 558–59. 
 22. Id. at 559. 
 23. Deitchman, 740 F.2d at 559 (quoting EEOC v. Univ. of Notre Dame du Lac, 715 F.2d 
331, 338 (7th Cir. 1983) (addressing the disclosure of materials between parties)). 
 24. Id. 
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Dr. Herbst argued how disclosing the information would destroy his ability 
to continue the registry.25 Dr. Herbst provided several affidavits from doctors 
who had provided the registry with information on the condition of 
confidentiality and would stop providing information if the confidentiality 
could be breached because of a subpoena.26 Further, Dr. Herbst explained the 
importance of keeping the research confidential, the significance of his 
research, and the necessity for the registry to continue in order to further 
research this form of cancer.27 Finally, even Squibb conceded that the loss of 
confidentiality would adversely affect Dr. Herbst and the registry.28 
Squibb claims its hardship would be its inability to adequately defend itself 
at trial.29 The plaintiff’s experts universally and repeatedly relied upon Dr. 
Herbst’s published articles to show the relationship between DES exposure and 
subsequent injuries in order to show causation.30 Without the underlying 
registry data upon which Dr. Herbst’s conclusions are based, Squibb argued it 
was unable to defend the issue of causation adequately.31 Neither party 
disputed that Dr. Herbst’s articles would be used against Squibb, and Squibb 
needed access to the underlying data to prepare its defense.32 Allowing access 
to the underlying data supporting Dr. Herbst’s findings would allow Squibb to 
critically scrutinize the credibility, accuracy, and validity of Dr. Herbst’s 
statistics and conclusions.33 
The court acknowledged this unique situation resulted in Squibb facing Dr. 
Herbst as a potential expert witness without him ever taking the stand or being 
subject to cross-examination.34 Any expert called upon to refute Dr. Herbst’s 
claims could be easily dismissed because he or she would not have viewed the 
collective information contained within the registry, unlike Dr. Herbst,35 since 
the registry is the sole source of information concerning the association 
between DES and this particular form of cancer.36 Thus, any denial of 
discovery would preclude Squibb from engaging in any meaningful cross-
examination of plaintiff’s experts’ opinions, based almost exclusively on Dr. 
Herbst’s articles.37 
 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 560. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Deitchman, 740 F.2d at 560. 
 29. Id. at 561. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Deitchman, 740 F.2d at 562. 
 34. Id. at 561. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 562. 
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The court concluded that for Squibb to properly defend the issue of 
causation, access to the registry’s underlying data to analyze its accuracy and 
methodology is absolutely essential.38 The court recognized the problem of 
confidentiality but also noted it was easily cured by simply expanding 
protection a little beyond the usual deletion of patient names.39 The court 
explained when it is confronted with a motion to quash a subpoena, its duty is 
not to deny any discovery, but to reduce the demand to what is reasonable, 
considering the discoverer’s needs and the discoveree’s problems.40 The court 
reasoned to give Squibb nothing would be an abuse of discretion and ordered 
the modification of the subpoena to protect the confidentiality of the registry’s 
information while giving Squibb discoverable information at its sole 
expense.41 
II.  1991 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Deitchman was decided in 198442 and was just one case representing the 
growing trend of the use of subpoenas to compel the giving of evidence and 
information by unretained experts.43 To address this trend, Rule 45 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding subpoenas was amended in 1991.44 
These amendments included a completely new section of the rule45 to protect 
witnesses from the misuse of a party’s subpoena power.46 While this 
amendment included many new and altered provisions, the relevant amended 
section for the unretained, independent researcher is: 
Rule 45. Subpoena 
(d) Protecting a Person Subject to a Subpoena; Enforcement 
(3) Quashing or Modifying a Subpoena 
(B) When Permitted. To protect a person subject to or affected by a 
subpoena, the court for the district where compliance is required may, 
on motion, quash or modify the subpoena if it requires: 
(i) disclosing a trade secret or other confidential research, 
development, or commercial information; or 
 
 38. Deitchman, 740 F.2d at 563. 
 39. Id. at 560. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 564, 566. 
 42. Id. at 556. 
 43. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3)(B)(ii) advisory committee’s note to 1991 amendment. 
 44. See FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3)(B)(ii) advisory committee’s note to 1991 amendment. 
 45. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c) advisory committee’s note to 1991 amendment. 
 46. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3) advisory committee’s note to 1991 amendment. 
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(ii) disclosing an unretained expert’s opinion or information that 
does not describe specific occurrences in dispute and results from 
the expert’s study that was not requested by a party.47 
A. The Need for the Rule: Same Case, Three Times 
Among the growing trend of using subpoenas to compel the researcher into 
providing the underlying data was Richard Snyder, who challenged a subpoena 
issued upon him by American Motor Corporation on three separate 
occasions.48 American Motor Corporation subpoenaed Snyder’s underlying 
data used to support his co-authored study for the Insurance Institute for 
Highway Safety.49 Snyder’s article, titled “On-Road Crash Experience of 
Utility Vehicles,” analyzed accident reports and engineering studies of utility 
vehicles.50 While most of the study’s conclusions were on general 
characteristics of utility vehicle accidents, a few conclusions singled out 
certain vehicles, such as the Jeep, as being more hazardous than others.51 
American Motor Corporation needed the underlying data in order to contest the 
opposing experts’ opinions about the safety of the Jeep vehicle, derived from 
the conclusions presented in Snyder’s study.52 
In Buchanan v. American Motors Corp., the Sixth Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s decision to quash the subpoena for the production of all the 
research data and documents related to the study.53 The court began its 
reasoning by identifying Snyder as a stranger to the litigation currently 
pending, who is not an expert witness or adviser to any party involved in the 
litigation.54 The court said the scope of discovery is in the sound discretion of 
the district court, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in quashing 
the subpoena on the grounds that the subpoena was unreasonably 
burdensome.55 The court explained ordering compliance would require Snyder, 
an expert who has no direct connection with the litigation, to spend an 
 
 47. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(3)(B). This section was originally under the (c) heading but the 
revisions in 2013 moved this to the (d) section. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d) advisory committee’s note 
to 2013 amendment. 
 48. Buchanan v. Am. Motors Corp., 697 F.2d 151, 151–52 (6th Cir. 1983); Wright v. Jeep 
Corp., 547 F. Supp. 871, 872–73 (E.D. Mich. 1982); In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. 211, 211–12 (D. 
Ariz. 1987). American Motors Corporation is the owner and manufacturer of the Jeep brand. See 
id. at 212. 
 49. Buchanan, 697 F.2d at 152; Wright, 547 F. Supp. at 873; In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. at 
212. 
 50. In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. at 212; Wright, 547 F. Supp. at 873. 
 51. In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. at 212; Wright, 547 F. Supp. at 873. 
 52. Buchanan, 697 F.2d at 152; Wright, 547 F. Supp. at 873; In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. at 
212. 
 53. Buchanan, 697 F.2d at 152. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
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unreasonable amount of time disclosing all of the raw data, including 
thousands of documents, accumulated over the course of a long and detailed 
research study.56 Further, the court supported its reasoning with the 
observation that Snyder is not being called as an expert witness with 
observations concerning the accident or because no other experts are available, 
but because American Motors Corporation wants to prove Snyder’s research 
study is not well founded.57 
In Wright v. Jeep Corp., the District Court for the Eastern District of 
Michigan ordered the subpoena be modified to reduce the burden on Snyder 
producing the requested documents with the payment of a reasonable fee for 
his information and services.58 Initially the court began by describing the 
relationship between conclusions contained in research reports and the 
underlying data from which these conclusions are drawn.59 The underlying 
data is analyzed, compared, and contrasted by the researcher to document and 
support the conclusions contained within the researcher’s report.60 The value 
of the conclusions turns upon the quality of the data, the methods of analysis 
used by the researcher, and the skill and perception of the researcher.61 Thus, if 
the conclusions of a research effort are to be fairly tested, the underlying data 
must be available to others equally skilled and perceptive.62 
With this relationship in mind, the Wright court then began its discussion 
by saying “‘[t]he public . . . has a right to every man’s evidence,’ except for 
those persons protected by a constitutional, common-law, or statutory 
privilege.”63 As such, the court needed to determine if a public policy reason 
existed to prevent Snyder from being subject to the subpoena.64 The court 
rejected Snyder’s reasoning that he did not have to comply with the subpoena 
because of a court rule,65 academic privilege,66 and the First Amendment.67 
However, the court listened to Snyder’s claim being subject to the subpoena 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Wright v. Jeep Corp., 547 F. Supp. 871, 877 (E.D. Mich. 1982). 
 59. Id. at 874. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Wright, 547 F. Supp. at 873 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1973) 
(quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972))). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 874 (“There is nothing in the federal rules that creates an exemption for the 
respondent [Snyder] from providing the relevant material requested.”). 
 66. Id. at 875 (“The respondent [Snyder] offers no case to support an academic privilege. . . . 
This court is unwilling to create a new privilege that would shield academics from testifying.”). 
 67. Id. (“[T]he court does not believe that compelling Professor Snyder to testify violates 
any first amendment rights.”). 
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would be burdensome, but did not quash the subpoena.68 Instead, the court 
determined the solution was not to prevent disclosure because it is too 
burdensome but to lessen the burden in order to permit the information to 
become available.69 The court explained every person is burdened by having to 
disclose knowledge he or she acquired for the purposes of litigation, even 
though it is acquired by accident.70 But this burden can be lessened, favoring 
disclosure, if measures are taken, such as payment of a reasonable fee.71 Thus, 
Snyder must still disclose his information, but the court would consider each 
parties’ recommendation on how to lessen the burden.72 
In In re Snyder, Snyder was once again faced with a subpoena from 
American Motors Corporation.73 In Snyder, the District Court for the District 
of Arizona agreed with the Sixth Circuit, and quashed the subpoena74 because 
it was unduly burdensome.75 This court once again explained Snyder’s 
relationship to the litigation and how the subpoena only sought the underlying 
information supporting the study, not Snyder’s expert conclusions.76 
Analyzing the burden to Snyder, the court said the series of legal skirmishes 
American Motors Corp. had imposed on a researcher who is a stranger to each 
of their lawsuits might be enough on its own to establish the excessively 
burdensome discovery standard.77 The burden of the subpoena was also 
unreasonable considering the collateral relationship to the litigation, the 
amount of self-impeaching material the report already contained, and the 
amount of information sought.78 American Motors Corp. sought the production 
of virtually every piece of paper involved in the study, from the funding 
requests, data gathering, data analysis, peer review, and post publication 
comments.79 The subpoena ordered Snyder to explain why any document was 
missing and its contents, which would have applied to everything because 
Snyder did not personally possess any of these documents.80 Thus, the court 
quashed the subpoena for being unreasonably burdensome.81 
 
 68. Wright, 547 F. Supp. at 877. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 876. 
 71. Id. at 877. 
 72. Id. 
 73. In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. 211, 211 (D. Ariz. 1987). 
 74. Id. at 216. 
 75. Id. at 214. 
 76. Id. at 212. 
 77. Id. at 214. 
 78. In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. at 214. 
 79. Id. at 212. 
 80. Id. at 212. This lawsuit took place seven years after the study was published, where 
Snyder had since retired from the University of Michigan and moved to Arizona. Id. at 211–12. 
Further, the University of Michigan no longer possessed the information as well. Id. at 212. 
 81. Id. at 216 
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1. The Court Recognizes the Problems Researcher’s Face 
The Snyder court also identified two main problems faced by researchers 
in this situation. First, the court explained that one of the greatest problems 
researchers face when parties seek to discover their underlying data supporting 
published research articles used by party experts is that no final judgment will 
ultimately decide the issue once and for all.82 The potential for repetition and 
the lack of finality can create serious problems for a researcher whose work is 
relevant to many actions.83 Neither of the parties ever need to file a claim 
against the researcher because they only seek a subpoena to discover the 
information the researcher used supporting the published article, not to hold 
the researcher liable in any way.84 As a result, res judicata, the doctrine that 
prevents parties from re-litigating the same claim,85 never applies because the 
researcher is never a party to the action.86 Further, collateral estoppel, the 
doctrine preventing the re-litigating of an issue decided against a party in 
earlier litigation,87 does not apply because the issue of discovery is not so 
essential to the dispute between the parties to apply.88 In addition, there is no 
statutory limitation period for the relevance of the researcher’s work because 
the research becomes relevant once a lawsuit is initiated.89 Thus, the researcher 
is forced to defend himself from each subpoena on a case-by-case basis with 
the results of one decision having no preclusive effect on any subsequent 
decisions.90 
Second, the court explained any solutions to the serious problems faced by 
Snyder are not available under the current rule of procedure and evidence.91 
The protections granted to expert witnesses are not available to Snyder because 
they only apply for facts known to and opinions held by experts and acquired 
or developed in anticipation of litigation.92 In addition, the federal procedural 
and evidentiary rules simply do not address the question regarding if Snyder 
can be compensated when his participation is involuntary, and who has not 
 
 82. Id. at 214. 
 83. In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. at 215. 
 84. Id. at 211 (non-party researcher being subpoenaed); Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble 
Co., 758 F.2d 1545, 1546 (11th Cir. 1985) (non-party research center being subpoenaed); In re 
Am. Tobacco Co., 880 F.2d 1520, 1522 (2d Cir. 1989) (non-party research doctor being 
subpoenaed). 
 85. Res Judicata, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 86. See In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. at 214. 
 87. Collateral Estoppel, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 88. In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. at 214. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 214–15. 
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witnessed the events giving rise to litigation.93 The court explained the need 
for more certainty in the discovery of academic research when the potential for 
repetition and lack of finality can create serious problems for a researcher 
whose work is relevant to many actions.94 The court called for members of the 
legal community to propose amendments to the existing rules of procedure that 
would increase certainty as to the scope of discovery from these involuntary 
expert witnesses.95 The amendments would come four years later.96 
2. Why the Different Outcomes? 
One of the purposes behind the changes to Rule 45 in the 1991 
amendments was to clarify the protections afforded to persons who are 
compelled to give information.97 When analyzing these three decisions, it is 
easy to see the differences these amendments were trying to clarify. After all, 
these three cases all answered the same question in three different ways.98 
The evolution of these three cases starts with Buchanan v. American 
Motors Corp. In Buchanan, the court clearly disfavored the subpoena ordering 
the deposition and production of documents from Snyder when the court did 
not even feel obligated to address the degree of need American Motors 
Corporation’s had regarding discovery.99 Further, the court appears to treat 
Snyder as an unwilling expert the court will not force to testify and give his 
opinions for or against a party. The court never refers to Snyder as a third party 
expert or as a researcher but instead repeatedly identifies Snyder as an expert 
witness who is a stranger to the litigation.100 In this sense, the court is 
 
 93. In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. at 215. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 216. 
 96. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3) advisory committee’s note, 1991 amendment. 
 97. FED. R. CIV. P. 45 advisory committee’s note, 1991 amendment, Purpose of Revision. 
 98. Buchanan v. Am. Motors Corp., 697 F.2d 151, 152 (6th Cir. 1983) (quashing the 
subpoena because Snyder was not an expert witness); In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. 211, 214, 216 (D. 
Ariz. 1987) (quashing the subpoena because it was unduly burdensome); Wright v. Jeep Corp., 
547 F. Supp. 871, 877 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (modifying the subpoena to reduce the burden faced by 
Snyder). 
 99. Buchanan, 697 F.2d at 151–52 (the court only states the reason why American Motors 
Corp. wants discovery but does not weigh this as a factor to be considered). 
 100. Id. at 151 (“seeks to subpoena appellee [Snyder], an expert residing in Michigan”) 
(emphasis added); Id. at 152 (“Appellee [Snyder] is a stranger to the North Carolina litigation 
and is not an expert witness or adviser to any party”) (emphasis added); Id. (“Assuming without 
deciding that the expert here . . . has neither an absolute nor qualified privilege”) (emphasis 
added); Id. (“Compliance with the subpoena would require the expert who has no direct 
connection with the litigation”) (emphasis added); Id. (“[W]e note that the expert is not being 
called because of observations . . . concerning the . . . accident . . . or because no other expert 
witnesses are available. Appellant [American Motors Corp.] wants . . . to prove . . . the expert’s 
written opinions . . . are not well founded.”) (emphasis added); Id. (“The District Court did not err 
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considering Snyder as a typical expert witness, one who would be retained by 
one party to offer his opinion at trial. Instead, the court needed to consider 
Snyder as a witness, with key additional information for the expert witnesses to 
use at trial, who is also an expert in the same field as those expert witnesses. 
This difference leads to a complete quashing of the subpoena instead of the 
solutions reached later. 
In Wright, the court starts off with a clear understanding of who Snyder is 
and his relationship to the litigation.101 With this understanding, the court treats 
Snyder as a third party witness with information relevant to the litigation at 
issue,102 unlike Buchanan’s treatment of Snyder as an unwilling expert.103 
While both courts use the unduly burdensome standard to reach their 
respective decisions,104 this difference in the treatment of Snyder leads the 
Wright court to grant discovery, because Snyder is a third party with relevant 
information to the litigation.105 
Finally, in Snyder, the court once again used the unduly burdensome 
standard and agreed with Buchanan to quash the subpoena.106 However, unlike 
Buchanan, the Snyder court recognized Snyder’s relationship to the 
litigation107 and did not consider Snyder to be an unwilling expert witness. But 
while the Snyder and Wright courts agreed on Snyder’s relationship to the 
litigation,108 the Snyder court quashed the subpoena instead of reducing the 
burden like the Wright court.109 A key difference was the difference in timing 
of these two cases. 
 
in finding improper the practice of calling an eminent expert witness (who is a stranger to the 
litigation) under a burdensome subpoena . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 101. Wright, 547 F. Supp. at 872–73. 
 102. Id. at 873. 
 103. See supra note 100. 
 104. Buchanan, 697 F.2d at 152; Wright, 547 F. Supp. at 876. 
 105. Wright, 547 F. Supp. at 876–77. 
 106. In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. at 216. 
 107. Id. at 211–12. 
 108. Id.; Wright, 547 F. Supp. at 872–74. 
 109. Wright, 547 F. Supp. at 877. The Snyder court also disagreed with the Wright court’s 
conclusion that if discovery were allowed, Snyder would be entitled to reasonable compensation. 
In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. at 215; Wright, 547 F. Supp. at 877. The Wright court awarded the fee 
because it did not believe American Motors Corp. was entitled to the benefits of Snyder’s 
research without paying for it. Wright, 547 F. Supp. at 877. In contrast, the Snyder court did not 
believe Snyder would be entitled to reasonable compensation because he was not an expert 
witness. In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. at 215. Recognizing that American Motors Corp. only sought 
Snyder’s first-hand knowledge of the underlying data, not his opinions, the Snyder court reasoned 
Snyder is an ordinary viewer witness to events that are only collaterally relevant to the current 
litigation. Id. Since the payment to expert witnesses is the only exception to the common law rule 
that witnesses are to be paid for their testimony, Snyder could not be paid because he is not an 
expert witness giving his opinion. Id. 
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One reason the Snyder court found the request for the underlying data 
burdensome was because the request was made seven years after the 
publication of the study.110 During that time, Snyder had retired from the 
university where he performed his research, moved to Arizona and no longer 
possessed any of the information requested by American Motors 
Corporation.111 However, the request in Wright was made two years after the 
publication of the study, while Snyder still worked for the university.112 This 
means Snyder still had access to his research at the university and could still 
access the requested information. In addition, the Snyder court could not have 
reduced the burden on Snyder because it is impossible to reduce Snyder’s 
burden of production when he does not have the documents.113 
B. The Current State of the Law 
One of the overriding purposes of the 1991 amendments to Rule 45 was 
“to clarify and enlarge the protections afforded [to] persons who are required 
to assist the court by giving information.”114 Specifically, the purpose behind 
the Rule 45(d)(3)(B)(i) amendments was to authorize the court to quash, 
modify, or condition a subpoena to protect a person from harmful disclosures 
of confidential information.115 Further, the purpose behind the Rule 
45(d)(3)(B)(ii) amendments was to provide “appropriate protection for the 
intellectual property of the non-party witness.”116 The committee recognized 
the growing problem of the use of subpoenas to compel the giving of evidence 
and information by unretained experts and created this rule to allow unretained 
experts to withhold their services and give assurance of reasonable 
compensation.117 The amendment also allowed for the subpoena to be 
modified in order to accommodate different competing interests.118 
Seemingly, the second part of this amendment would apply to the 
hypothetical situation referenced at the beginning of this article. The plaintiff 
sought to disclose the unretained expert’s information that did not describe the 
specific injury resulting in litigation but resulted from the expert’s own, 
independently conducted study. Further, when such underlying information is 
confidential or obtained because of the promise of confidentiality, the first part 
 
 110. See In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. at 211–12. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Wright, 547 F. Supp. at 872–73. 
 113. In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. at 212. 
 114. FED. R. CIV. P. 45 advisory committee’s note, 1991 amendment, Purpose of Revision. 
 115. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3)(B)(i) advisory committee’s note, 1991 amendment. 
 116. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3)(B)(ii) advisory committee’s note, 1991 amendment. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
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of the amendment should also apply. Thus, this amendment should make it 
easier for a researcher to defeat a subpoena in this situation. 
In practice, these additions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have 
done little to help unretained, third party experts or researchers from disclosing 
underlying information supporting their published conclusions. 
First, the amendment has done nothing to change the standard used to 
determine whether or not discovery should be compelled. Before the 
amendment, the courts used a balancing test to determine whether or not to 
compel the researcher to disclose the underlying information.119 As described 
in Deitchman, when protection from a subpoena is sought, the court must 
apply a balancing test to determine whether the need of the party seeking 
disclosure outweighs the adverse effect such disclosure would have on the 
policies underlying the claimed privilege.120 After the 1991 amendment, the 
courts continued to use a balancing test to determine whether to compel 
discovery.121 In Cusumano, the court artfully explained: 
 
 119. In re Am. Tobacco Co., 880 F.2d 1520, 1529 (2d Cir. 1989) (applying a balancing test of 
the need of disclosure against the privilege); Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 
1545, 1547 (11th Cir. 1985) (balancing the need to obtain discovery against the need to maintain 
the confidentiality of the information); Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 740 F.2d 556, 559 
(7th Cir. 1984) (performing a balancing test to determine if the need of disclosure outweighs the 
claimed privilege); Dow Chem. Co. v. Allen 672 F.2d 1262, 1275 (7th Cir. 1982) (balancing a 
privilege against important competing interests); Anker v. G.D. Searle & Co., 126 F.R.D. 515, 
518 (M.D. N.C. 1989) (adopting a balancing test, the court weighs the need for discovery against 
the harm, prejudice or burden to the other party); In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. 211, 215 (D. Ariz. 
1987) (evaluating the subpoena requires the weighing of burdensomeness, relevance, alternative 
sources of the information, needs of the case, and the importance of the issues at stake); Wright v. 
Jeep Corp., 547 F. Supp. 871, 873 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (determining whether any public policy 
reasons exist to exempt a researcher from providing the requested materials). 
 120. Deitchman, 740 F.2d at 559. 
 121. Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 716 (1st Cir. 1998) (applying a balancing 
test weighing need against injury); In re Domestic Drywall Antitrust Litig., 300 F.R.D. 234, 239 
(E.D. Pa. 2014) (balancing test requires a court to weigh the relevance, need, confidentiality, and 
other harm compliance would cause on the subpoenaed party); In re NCAA Student-Athlete 
Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., No. 4:12-mc-00508 JAR, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147174, at 
*4 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 12, 2012) (balancing the relevance of the information, party’s need, and 
hardship to the party subject to the subpoena); Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Int’l Healthcare Worker 
Safety Ctr., No. 3:11-MC-28, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89402, at *8 (W.D. Va. Aug. 11, 2011) 
(applying a balancing approach); Crescenta Valley Water Dist. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 269 F.R.D. 
360, 363–64 (S.D. N.Y. 2010) (weighing the need of the party seeking the discovery against any 
undue hardships created by permitting it); In re Bextra & Celebrex Mktg. Sales Practices & Prod. 
Liab. Litig., 249 F.R.D. 8, 12 (D. Mass. 2008) (applying a balancing test); Cable v. Weinman, 
233 F.R.D. 70, 78–80 (D. Mass. 2006) (weighing the factors of relevance, privilege, cumulative 
evidence and undue burden); Bluitt v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 94-2318, 1994 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 16933, at *4–7 (E.D. La. Nov. 21, 1994) (weighing the need for confidentiality against 
the need for disclosure). 
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[W]hen a subpoena seeks divulgement of confidential information compiled by 
a journalist or academic researcher in anticipation of publication, courts must 
apply a balancing test. This test contemplates consideration of a myriad of 
factors, often uniquely drawn out of the factual circumstances of the particular 
case. Each party comes to this test holding a burden. Initially, the movant must 
make a prima facie showing that his claim of need and relevance is not 
frivolous. Upon such a showing, the burden shifts to the objector to 
demonstrate the basis for withholding the information. The court then must 
place those factors that relate to the movant’s need for the information on one 
pan of the scales and those that reflect the objector’s interest in confidentiality 
and the potential injury to the free flow of information that disclosure portends 
on the opposite pan.122 
Therefore, even with the 1991 amendments, the researcher is still subject to a 
balancing test to determine if their need in resisting discovery outweighs the 
needs of the parties in litigation.123 
The reasons courts continue to apply the balancing test after the 
amendment is because the amendment application itself is discretionary. The 
amendment tells the court is may modify or quash a subpoena. Since the 
amendment does not tell the courts they have to take one action or another, but 
instead lets the courts decide, the courts simply continued to exercise the 
discretion they had before the amendment. 
Further, if the unretained, third party expert wants to challenge the 
subpoena, they must go to court and argue the uncertainty of a balancing test to 
determine whether or not they have to comply with the subpoena. To a person 
who is not related to the litigation, this may seem like a daunting, 
unnecessarily expensive and fundamentally unfair request. The researcher has 
no desire to be part of the case, because if they did, they could simply become 
 
 122. Cusumano, 162 F.3d at 716 (internal citations omitted); see also In re Domestic Drywall 
Antitrust Litig., 300 F.R.D. at 239: 
The serve-and-volley of the federal discovery rules govern the resolution of a motion to 
quash. The subpoenaing party must first show that its requests are relevant to its claims or 
defenses, within the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1). Next, the 
burden shifts to the subpoenaed nonparty who must show that disclosure of the 
information is protected under Rule 45(d)(3)(A) or (B). If the subpoenaed nonparty claims 
the protections under Rule 45(d)(3)(B) or asserts that disclosure would subject it to undue 
burden under Rule 45(d)(3)(A), it must show that disclosure will cause it a clearly defined 
and serious injury. This burden is particularly heavy to support a motion to quash as 
contrasted to some more limited protection such as a protective order. (internal citations 
omitted) (internal quotations omitted). 
 123. Retractable Techs., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89402, at *7–8 (noting Rule 45(c)(3)(B) 
allows a court to protect confidential information by modifying or quashing a subpoena, applying 
a balancing test to decide); Fanjoy v. Calico Brands, Inc., No. 2:06-mc-469, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 55158, at *12 (D. Utah Aug. 7, 2006) (noting Rule 45(c)(3)(B) allows courts to balance 
the needs of confidentiality against the need for disclosure). 
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a retained expert for a party and be paid. Further, the independent researcher 
does not want to bear the cost of challenging a subpoena. Unlike the plaintiffs 
in litigation who chose to enter into a lawsuit and bear litigations expenses, or 
the defendants who may have been expecting litigation or at least have some 
control over its expense, an independent researcher has no such options. By 
being compelled by a subpoena, the researcher is forced to hand over the 
information, incurring the financial and potentially harmful research cost 
associated, or incur the cost of challenging the subpoena which may still result 
in the information being turned over. In addition, if the researcher obtained his 
or her information using confidentiality agreements, the researcher may be 
forced to spend money to challenge the subpoena or face liability for breaking 
those agreements. 
Second, what little impact the amendment had was procedural in allowing 
the third party expert to combat the subpoena. Before the amendment, courts 
were not uniform on what procedural law(s) governed the ability for 
unretained, third party experts to challenge the subpoena. Courts allowed the 
third party experts to challenge the subpoena by treating the challenge as a 
regular motion to quash a subpoena,124 by combining the Rule 26 and Rule 45 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,125 or by solely following Rule 26 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding protective orders.126 Such 
difference may be explained by one court that said the available Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure simply do not address gaining discovery from this kind of 
expert.127 Thus, the courts were left to fend for themselves and determine what 
procedural law applied. 
After the amendment, most courts agreed the amendment now governed 
subpoenas seeking discovery from this type of expert.128 However, the First 
 
 124. Buchanan v. Am. Motors Corp., 697 F.2d 151, 152 (6th Cir. 1983) (quashing a subpoena 
based on the subpoena being unreasonably burdensome); Dow Chem. Co., 672 F.2d at 1266 
(allowing the district court to decide how to enforce the subpoena); Wright, 547 F. Supp. at 872 
(appealing a decision to quash a subpoena). 
 125. Deitchman, 740 F.2d at 559 (7th Cir. 1984) (applying both Rule 26 and Rule 45); Anker 
v. G.D. Searle & Co., 126 F.R.D. 515, 518 (M.D. N.C. 1989) (applying both Rule 26 and 45 
when evaluating a challenge to a subpoena); Kennedy v. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 115 F.R.D. 
497, 499 (D. Conn.1987) (using Rules 26 and 45 to quash the subpoena and seek a protective 
order); In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. 211, 214 (D. Ariz. 1987) (using Rules 26 and 45 to quash the 
subpoena and seek a protective order). 
 126. Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545, 1547 (11th Cir. 1985) (using a 
Rule 26 protective orders to modify a subpoena). Rule 26(c) allows a party subject to discovery to 
move for a protective order and Rule 45(b) allows the subpoena to be quashed or modified. 
Deitchman, 740 F.2d at 559. 
 127. In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. at 215. 
 128. In re Domestic Drywall Antitrust Litig., 300 F.R.D. 234, 239 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (applying 
Rule 45(d)(3)(B) in a balancing test); Retractable Techs., Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89402, at 
*7–8 (applying Rule 45(c)(3)(B)); Crescenta Valley Water Dist. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 269 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2017] THE CHALLENGE OF ACHIEVING DISCOVERY FROM THIRD-PARTY 589 
Circuit in Cusumano continued to treat this issue under Rule 26 regarding 
discovery explaining discovery rules apply to subpoenas issued under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 45.129 In reality such distinctions of what procedural 
law(s) apply do not substantively matter. As explained above, the courts, both 
before and after the amendment, still apply a balancing test to determine the 
merits of the challenge. But one such difference the amendment makes is the 
clarity it provides. First, experts now know exactly what to do in order to 
challenge the subpoena in court, instead of guessing on what procedural law 
applies. Second, the rule provides a list of information subject to protection 
instead of relying on the more general undue burden reasoning generally 
required by both Rule 26 protective orders and Rule 45 protection from 
subpoenas. 
Finally, this amendment only applies when the expert is a third party to the 
litigation. When the unretained researcher used a source for their research that 
is now a party to the litigation, the researcher is no longer a third party.130 The 
researcher now has first-hand factual knowledge directly related to one of the 
parties in the litigation.131 Such factual information describing specific events 
and occurrences involved in the dispute are not shielded by Rule 
45(c)(3)(B)(ii).132 Thus, the researcher is no longer a third party to the 
litigation but a fact witness, no longer protected by Rule 45(c)(3)(B)(ii).133 
III.  TRYING TO PROTECT THE INFORMATION 
Researchers have attempted many different ways to protect themselves 
from being subject to the disclosure required by the subpoena.134 Unfortunately 
for the researchers, most of these methods fail,135 but some succeed in 
preventing discovery to varying degrees.136 
A. Unsuccessful Attempts to Protect the Information 
Several different attempts by researchers to resist discovery have been 
unsuccessful. Such unsuccessful attempts include the researchers claiming they 
 
F.R.D. 360, 363 (S.D. N.Y. 2010) (applying Rule 45(c)(3)(B)(i)); Fanjoy, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
55158, at *6 (applying Rule 45(c)(3)(B)(i)); Bluitt v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 94-2318, 
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16933, at *4–5 (E.D. La. Nov. 21, 1994) (analyzing the applicability of 
Rule 45(c)(3)(B)). 
 129. Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 714 (1st Cir. 1998). 
 130. Cable v. Weinman, 233 F.R.D. 70, 77 (D. Mass. 2006). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See id. 
 134. See infra Part III. A–B. 
 135. See infra Part III. A. 
 136. See infra Part III. B. 
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are protected as researchers, protected by court rule, protected by the First 
Amendment, and protected by the expert’s privilege. 
1. Researcher Protection 
The court in Wright v. Jeep Corp. refused to give academic researchers 
protection from being subject to a subpoena solely because they are academic 
researchers.137 The court refused to recognize such an academic privilege when 
no support was provided to show that such a privilege is recognized.138 The 
court was unwilling to create the privilege because privileges are the exception 
to the general duty of every citizen to provide evidence when necessary for 
justice and, as such, such exceptions are not lightly created or expansively 
construed.139 
2. Court Rule 
In Wright v. Jeep Corp., Snyder again claimed he did not have to provide 
any documents because he was not a retained expert.140 Snyder’s argument 
was premised on the fact he did not fall within any of the subcategories 
specifically addressing the discovery of experts in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and thus could not be compelled by them.141 The court was quick to 
point out the error in Snyder’s argument, explaining “the administration of 
justice requires testimony of all persons unless reasons are established to the 
contrary.”142 Since Snyder was not an expert under these rules, these 
procedures did not apply to him, and thus the only question for disclosure is if 
the material was relevant.143 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state a party 
may obtain discovery regarding any matter which is relevant to the subject 
matter involved in the pending action.144 Because there was a high probability 
Snyder’s research would be used at trial, through expert witnesses, and the 
underlying facts of the study support the study’s conclusions, the underlying 
facts are relevant to determine the validity of the expert’s conclusions.145 
Therefore, nothing in the federal rules prevents the disclosure of the underlying 
information.146 
 
 137. Wright v. Jeep Corp., 547 F. Supp. 871, 875 (E.D. Mich. 1982). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 874. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Wright, 547 F. Supp. at 874. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
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3. First Amendment 
Once again in Wright v. Jeep Corp., Snyder tried another basis for resisting 
the subpoena, claiming the First Amendment protection.147 While the court 
agreed a court ordered subpoena provides enough government action to raise a 
constitutional question, the court determined the First Amendment did not 
apply.148 The protection of the First Amendment affords the right to write and 
speak; it does not give a right to withdraw published material from public 
scrutiny.149 Nor does the First Amendment give a right to refuse to disclose 
facts that are relevant in making a judgment as to the correctness of the 
published material.150 Further, the court noted the limited protection given to 
reporters and writers under the First Amendment is given to preserve the flow 
of information from sources.151 This protection is given to protect confidential 
sources, in order to not jeopardize the flow of information.152 However, in 
Wright, the confidentiality of Snyder’s sources were not at issue, thus there 
was no First Amendment concern.153 
In addition, the court in Wright explained the possibility of being 
subpoenaed to testify exists for everyone.154 At any time a person can see or 
hear something that will cause him or her to be subpoenaed to testify.155 Every 
person is subject to a subpoena to tell or produce information about what he or 
she observed.156 In many respects, an academic researcher is no different than 
any other witness who may be called upon to give evidence.157 
4. Expert’s Privilege 
Some researchers in this discovery situation, still believing they are subject 
to the traditional and more common rule regarding experts, attempt to claim 
the expert’s privilege to avoid the production demanded by the subpoena.158 
The expert’s privilege is available to experts who have no personal connection 
to a case and gives the expert an absolute privilege to not be compelled to give 
his or her opinions at trial.159 In one such case, In re American Tobacco Co., 
 
 147. Wright, 547 F. Supp. at 875. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 876. 
 152. Wright, 547 F. Supp. at 876. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Wright, 547 F. Supp. at 876. 
 158. In re Am. Tobacco Co., 880 F.2d 1520, 1527 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 159. Id. In diversity cases, the existence of a privilege is determined by state law, and this is 
the expert’s privilege as defined by New York law. Id. Other states have a similar approach to the 
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the court quickly dismissed such a claim of privilege by concluding that no 
expert is being asked to testify or to prepare a report for litigation.160 Since the 
expert is not being compelled to give their opinions for litigation, the expert 
privilege does not apply.161 
B. Some Protection Granted 
Researchers are not completely helpless to resist discovery. Researchers 
can attempt to use any number of methods to quash the subpoena, included 
claiming the research scholar’s privilege, journalist’s privilege, attorney client 
privilege, and confidentiality. However, as illustrated by the following cases, 
these protections are very limited and often only applicable in certain specific 
situations. In fact, even though these methods may provide some relief to the 
researcher, often complete dismissal of such a discovery request is 
unattainable. 
1. Research Scholar’s Privilege 
The Research Scholar’s Privilege protects researchers from disclosing their 
research.162 This privilege is also called the researchers’ privilege, academic 
privilege, or academic freedom privilege depending on the jurisdiction.163 The 
research scholar’s privilege can be considered a narrower version of the 
expert’s privilege, but instead of preventing the expert researcher from 
disclosing opinions, the research scholar’s privilege prevents the disclosure of 
 
compelling of expert opinions at trial. Lombardo v. Gardner, 82 Pa. D. & C.4th 233, 242 (Pa. 
C.P. Lawrence Cnty. 2007) (“It is well established in Pennsylvania that an expert witness cannot 
be compelled to testify as to his opinion against his will.”); Kridos v. Vinskus, 483 So. 2d 727, 
731 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (an expert may not be compelled to testify purely because he is an 
expert, but only because he has information bearing rather directly on the case). Other 
jurisdictions have a more discretionary approach to compelling expert testimony. Mason v. 
Robinson, 340 N.W.2d 236, 242 (Iowa 1983) (before the court compels an expert to testify and 
absent any other connection to the litigation, the compelling party must demonstrate compelling 
necessity that overcomes the expert’s and public’s need for protection); Carney-Hayes v. 
Northwest Wis. Home Care, Inc., 699 N.W.2d 524, 534 (Wis. 2005) (“To compel an expert to 
testify involuntarily, a party must not only show a compelling need for the testimony but also 
present a plan of reasonable compensation.”). 
 160. In re Am. Tobacco Co., 880 F.2d at 1527–28. 
 161. See id. 
 162. Id. at 1528; see Dow Chem. Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262, 1275 (7th Cir. 1982) 
(discussing the privilege in terms of academic freedom but having the same effect of preventing 
the disclosure of research). 
 163. Frank C. Woodside, III & Michael J. Gray, Researchers’ Privilege: Full Disclosure, 32 
T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 1, 7 (2015). However, these privilege names can also refer to completely 
different privileges as well. EEOC v. Univ. of Notre Dame du Lac, 715 F.2d 331, 333–34 (7th 
Cir. 1983) (claiming academic privilege in the peer review process of determining the tenure 
status for a professor). 
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the information those opinions stem from. Currently, the Second and Seventh 
Circuits have expressly applied this privilege to successfully and 
unsuccessfully protect independent researchers and their underlying research 
data.164 A key distinction used by courts when determining the success of this 
privilege is whether the research has been published yet or in the process of 
being prepared to be published.165 
In Dow Chemical Co. v. Allen, the court touched upon such a privilege 
while discussing academic freedom, the ability for research to be carried on 
without interference from the government or community.166 In Dow Chemical 
Co., Dow Chemical Company sought the underlying information supporting 
several unfinished studies167 suggesting a chemical compound Dow 
manufactures can be dangerous.168 The court explained there were several 
reasons the researchers would face a chilling effect on their research when 
their studies had not yet been published.169 First, enforcing the subpoenas 
before the studies had completed would leave the researchers with the 
knowledge, throughout the remainder of their studies, that their results were 
being actively scrutinized by a biased third party.170 Such a burden on the 
researchers could be unnerving, discouraging and limit their fearlessness in 
pursuit of information.171 Second, the premature disclosure of the underlying 
information would jeopardize both the studies and the researchers’ careers.172 
Such disclosure would make the studies unfit for scientific publication, would 
bypass the peer review process, harm their credibility and risk total destruction 
of the research.173 Therefore, the subpoena was quashed because any 
disclosure of the research data would be premature.174 
In In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation, a 
researcher challenged a subpoena requesting the underlying data and the 
 
 164. Dow Chem. Co., 672 F.2d 1262 at 1276–77; In re Am. Tobacco Co., 880 F.2d 1520 at 
1529. While not expressly applying the research scholar’s privilege, a District Court in the Eighth 
Circuit has acknowledged the validity of the policies supporting the privilege in its protection of 
research data before the study is published. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness 
Licensing Litig., No. 4:12-mc-00508 JAR, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147174, at *8–9 (E.D. Mo. 
Oct. 12, 2012). 
 165. In re Am. Tobacco Co., 880 F.2d at 1529; Dow Chem. Co., 672 F.2d at 1276; In re 
NCAA, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147174, at *8. 
 166. Dow Chem. Co., 672 F.2d at 1275. 
 167. Id. at 1273. 
 168. Id. at 1266. 
 169. Id. at 1276. The studies at issue were not completed or subject to peer review. Id. at 
1268. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Dow Chemical Co., 672 F.2d at 1276. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 1273. 
 174. Id. at 1278. 
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unpublished study, still in the peer review process.175 The court applied a 
balancing test176 and considered the fact that the article had not been published 
and was still subject to peer review.177 The court explained peer review is a 
critical step in finalizing a research study, for it is only after this process that 
the academic piece considered finished.178 Revealing an article before the peer 
review process is complete could reveal conclusions that will differ from the 
final, published article, thereby undermining the article and researchers 
credibility.179 The court then granted the researcher’s protective order in part to 
prevent premature disclosure but ordered the study and data be turned over 
once the peer review process was done.180 
In In re American Tobacco Co., the court held if the research scholar’s 
privilege did exist, it did not apply.181 American Tobacco was attempting to 
obtain the underlying data from a research doctor who published several 
studies suggesting a significant increase in the likelihood of cancer when 
smoking is combined with exposure to asbestos.182 The court explained there 
would be no chilling effect on scientific research because the information 
requested was used for studies long since published.183 The court noted the few 
times such a privilege had existed was to protect researchers from premature 
disclosure of their research.184 Thus, the research scholar’s privilege did not 
apply.185 
2. Journalist Privilege 
In Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., the court ruled academic researchers 
should be afforded protection similar to that which the law provides for 
journalists.186 The court concluded the same concerns regarding discovery 
 
 175. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation, No. 4:12-mc-
00508 JAR, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147174, at *1. (E.D. Mo. Oct. 12, 2012). 
 176. Id. at *3. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. In re NCAA, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147174, at *4. For a discussion on the treatment of 
discovery regarding the peer review notes themselves, see In re Bextra & Celebrex Mktg. Sales 
Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., 249 F.R.D. 8, 12. (D. Mass. 2008). There, the court declined to 
allow the peer review comments to be discoverable in the interest of maintaining the 
confidentiality of the peer review process. Id. at 15. 
 181. In re Am. Tobacco Co., 880 F.2d 1520, 1529 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 182. Id. at 1522. 
 183. Id. at 1529. 
 184. Id. at 1528. 
 185. Id. at 1530. 
 186. Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 714 (1st Cir. 1998). The underlying action 
against Microsoft involved the U.S. Department of Justice charging Microsoft with federal 
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requests of journalists, the undermining of gathering and dissemination of 
information, also applied to academic researchers.187 The court reasoned 
scholars are information gatherers and disseminators as well and if their 
research materials were freely subject to subpoena, sources would stop 
confiding in them.188 As with reporters, a drying-up of sources sharply limits 
the information available to researchers, thus restricting their output.189 Just as 
a journalist, stripped of his sources, would write fewer and less insightful 
articles, an academic, stripped of sources, would also write fewer and less 
insightful studies.190 The court concluded such similarities of concern and 
function mandate a similar level of protection for journalists and academic 
researchers.191 However, the court noted such protection is only available to 
the same extent available for journalists, usually just confidential 
information.192 
In Cusumano, the academics were granted access to Netscape’s employees 
and their business practices because of the academics promise of 
confidentiality.193 The court applied a balancing test and determined the 
promise of confidentiality outweighed the need for discovery,194 even though 
Microsoft had a legitimate need and use for the information.195 The court 
reasoned scholars studying management practices depend upon the voluntary 
disclosures of industry insiders to develop the facts supporting conclusions.196 
These insiders lack a reason for divulging confidential business information 
such that the promises of confidentiality are needed to give a sense of security 
to facilitate the agreement to be interviewed.197 Thus, allowing a competitor to 
have access to these interviews will not only harm these academics’ future 
research efforts, but other researchers as well when promises of confidentiality 
can be defeated.198 
 
antitrust violations for requiring computer manufactures to install Internet Explorer if they wished 
to install the Windows operating system on their computers. Id. at 710–11. 
 187. Id. at 714. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Cusumano, 162 F.3d at 714. 
 192. Id. at 715. 
 193. Id. at 711. 
 194. Id. at 717. 
 195. Id. at 716. 
 196. Cusumano, 162 F.3d at 717. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
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3. Attorney Client Privilege 
Studies and published research papers do not just come from academic 
researchers associated with universities but from any person who has acquired 
information on a topic. Such information can be easily gathered over the 
course of one’s career as a lawyer. 
In Cable v. Wienman, an attorney published an article in the IPO Journal 
which stated the underwriting fees for services related to Initial Public 
Offerings (IPO) was fixed at 7%.199 The litigation involved an antitrust action 
against banks for conspiring to fix underwriting fees for IPOs at 7%.200 The 
attorney had formed his opinion about underwriting fees based on his twenty-
five years of experience dealing with IPOs.201 The attorney argued the 
information sought was protected by attorney client privilege.202 The court 
agreed but identified certain situations where such a privilege would not 
apply.203 Thus, since only the testimony of the attorney was sought to 
determine the factual underpinnings of the attorney’s conclusions,204 such a 
privilege could be easily invoked during the attorney’s deposition if the 
privilege applied.205 
4. Confidentiality 
Researchers always raise the issue of confidentiality as a key reason why 
disclosure should not be allowed. Quite often, the party seeking disclosure will 
limit its request to allow the researcher to redact any confidential information 
in an attempt to avoid claims of confidentiality.206 However, confidentiality is 
not always available, causing researchers, who still wish to prevent disclosure, 
to claim other reasons disclosure should not be granted.207 
Confidentiality is used in a variety of ways depending upon the nature of 
the confidentiality, why confidentiality was obtained, and other facts 
surrounding the case. Most often, arguing confidentiality will only grant a 
researcher a protective order to protect the disclosure of the confidential 
information as demonstrated by the following cases: 
 
 199. Cable v. Weinman, 233 F.R.D. 70, 72–73 (D. Mass. 2006). 
 200. Id. at 72. 
 201. Id. at 73. 
 202. Id. at 78. 
 203. Id. at 78–79. 
 204. Cable, 233 F.R.D. at 76. 
 205. Id. at 80. 
 206. Dow Chemical Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262, 1277 (7th Cir. 1982); In re Am. Tobacco 
Co., 880 F.2d 1520, 1525 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 207. Wright v. Jeep Corp., 547 F. Supp 871, 875–76 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (requested material 
was not confidential, so the researcher tried to claim privilege and first amendment protection); 
see also Crescenta Valley Water Dist. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 269 F.R.D. 360, 364–65 (S.D. N.Y. 
2010) (arguing undue burden to prevent discovery). 
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• Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons: The court issued a protective order to 
allow discovery while protecting any confidential medical information.208 
• Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co.: The court upheld a protective order 
allowing a research center to redact the personal information of women who 
participated in a research study.209 
• Kennedy v. Connecticut Department of Public Safety: The court refused to 
quash the subpoena on the basis of confidentiality but allowed the 
researcher to redact the names of individuals who provided information on 
the basis of confidentiality.210 
• Fanjoy v. Calico Brands, Inc.: To protect the confidentiality of the study’s 
participants, the court ordered only the disclosure of age and genders of 
individual participants.211 
• Retractable Techs., Inc. v. International Healthcare Worker Safety Center: 
Discovery was allowed because the protective order allowed for the 
protection of confidential information.212 
Arguments made by researchers that the disclosure of any information, 
confidential or not, will destroy future efforts to collect data,213 inhibit the 
researcher’s ability to find future study participants,214 or violate the 
confidentiality terms promised to the study participants in order to gain the 
participants’ participation215 are only effective at achieving a protective order, 
not quashing the subpoena. One court has said “quashing a subpoena is 
inappropriate where confidentiality interests can be safeguarded by means of a 
protective order.”216 Thus, when a protective order can be effective in 
safeguarding and minimizing any potential harm to confidentiality interests, 
such an order is the appropriate action to balance the competing interests of the 
researcher and the party seeking discovery.217 
Defeating a subpoena on the sole basis of confidentiality is an almost 
insurmountable task. In a rare case, the sole reason of confidentiality was 
successfully used to prevent the discovery of underlying data in Bluitt v. R.J. 
 
 208. Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 740 F.2d 556, 564 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 209. Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545, 1546–48 (11th Cir. 1985). 
 210. Kennedy v. Connecticut Dep’t of Public Safety, 115 F.R.D. 497, 501 (D. Conn. 1987). 
 211. Fanjoy v. Calico Brands, Inc., No. 2:06-mc-469, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55158, at *13 
(D. Utah Aug. 7, 2006). 
 212. Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Int’l Healthcare Worker Safety Ctr., No. 3:11-MC-28, 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89402, at *8–9 (W.D. Va. Aug. 11, 2011). 
 213. Deitchman, 740 F.2d at 559–60. 
 214. Farnsworth, 758 F.2d at 1547. 
 215. Kennedy, 115 F.R.D. at 501 (disclosing such individuals would needlessly jeopardize the 
important researcher-subject relationship); Fanjoy, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55158, at *12–13; 
Retractable Techs., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89402, at *8. 
 216. Retractable Techs., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89402, at *8. 
 217. See id. at *8–9. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
598 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:573 
Reynolds Tobacco Co.218 The court explained how the requesting party was 
unable to show the necessary level of need, required by Rule 45(c)(3)(B), to 
overcome confidentiality because the opposing party’s experts had not yet 
been shown to rely on the study.219 Thus, instead of a protective order to 
maintain confidentiality, the court determined quashing the subpoena was 
appropriate, but the court left the issue open to review if the study would be 
relied upon by experts.220 
Using confidentiality to quash a subpoena and dismiss the discovery 
request is more likely to be successful when combining it with other 
arguments. In Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., the researchers used 
confidentiality to help support their side of a balancing test after claiming a 
type of journalistic privilege.221 The court explained the need for the 
researchers to maintain their promise of confidentiality to research participants, 
who otherwise would not have agreed to disclose any information.222 The court 
used the need for confidentiality, along with other factors, including First 
Amendment values and the non-party status, to show that the researchers 
prevailed on the balancing test and quashed the subpoena.223 
IV.  RE-EXAMINING THE SITUATION 
With the deck stacked against the researcher and the inevitable order 
compelling discovery waiting, what can researchers do to protect themselves? 
A. Is the Research Scholar’s Privilege Worth Revisiting? 
Perhaps the most consistent and reliable tool researchers have used to 
defeat the discovery subpoena is the research scholar’s privilege. When 
applied, the few courts that have addressed this privilege have consistently 
refused to allow discovery when the following elements are present: 
1. Independent, Third Party Researcher; 
2. The only connection between the litigation and the researcher, is the 
research currently being conducted by the researcher; and 
 
 218. Bluitt v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 94-2318, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16933, at *4, 
*8 (E.D. La. Nov. 21, 1994). 
 219. Id. at *4–5. 
 220. Id. at *7. 
 221. Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 716–17 (1st Cir. 1998). 
 222. Id. at 717. 
 223. Id. Compelling the disclosure of these research materials would reduce the free flow of 
information to the public, harming a fundamental First Amendment value. Id. The court also 
iterated non-parties have a different set of expectations in litigation and concern for the unwanted 
burden thrust upon non-parties is a factor entitled to special weight. Id. 
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3. The researcher has not published the results of the research.224 
The problem for researchers is the fourth element. As currently tailored 
and applied by the courts, the research scholar’s privilege is only viable when 
the research has not been published. While this has helped a few researchers 
resist discovery, it does not help the vast majority of researchers who have 
already published their findings. Could researchers try and expand this 
privilege and protect the data once the research is published? 
Probably not. The fourth element, the requirement that the research is not 
yet published, is the most important element and the reason why the privilege 
has been so successful at preventing discovery. Courts have continuously been 
persuaded by the harmful effects premature disclosure of research will have 
including: (1) subjecting the researchers to the knowledge their research will 
be scrutinized by biased third parties with opposite interests;225 (2) 
jeopardizing the research studies and the researchers’ careers;226 (3) making 
the research data vulnerable to preemptive or predatory publication by 
others;227 and (4) maintaining the peer review process to finalize and add 
credibility to a research study.228 Several circuits, including the Second, 
Seventh, and Eighth, as well as various states including, California, Louisiana, 
and the District of Columbia, have found this reasoning to be persuasive and 
adopted a similar approach to the research scholar’s privilege.229 But once the 
research articles have been published, these harmful effects are no longer 
present to resist discovery.230 
Privileges protect certain privacy interests the court has recognized as 
significant.231 Privileges exist because there are public policy reasons the 
information should not be disclosed.232 Privileges represent a compromise, a 
 
 224. Dow Chem. Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262, 1276–77 (7th Cir. 1982); In re NCAA Student-
Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., No. 4:12-mc-00508 JAR, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
147174, at *7–8 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 12, 2012) (finding a general research scholar’s privilege would 
not apply, but noting these four elements are present and important in the decision not to grant 
discovery); see also Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 740 F.2d 556, 560 (7th Cir. 1984) 
(agreeing with the Allen court that such a privilege exists under these conditions). 
 225. Dow Chem. Co., 672 F.2d at 1276. 
 226. Id. 
 227. In re Am. Tobacco Co., 880 F.2d 1520, 1529 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 228. In re NCAA, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147174, at *8. 
 229. Dow Chem. Co., 672 F.2d at 1262, 1276–77; In re Am. Tobacco Co., 880 F.2d at 1529; 
In re NCAA, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147174, at *8–9; Humane Society of U.S. v. Superior Court, 
214 Cal. App. 4th 1233, 1263 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013); In re Philip Morris, 706 So. 2d 665, 667–68 
(La. Ct. App. 1998); Plough, Inc. v. National Academy of Sciences, 530 A.2d 1152, 1157–58 
(D.C. 1987). 
 230. In re Am. Tobacco Co., 880 F.2d at 1529. 
 231. Robert S. Catz & Jill J. Lange, Judicial Privilege, 22 GA. L. REV. 89, 95 (1987). 
 232. Privilege, WEX LEGAL DICTIONARY, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/privilege 
[https://perma.cc/9RZF-ENSB]. 
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balancing of interests between one party’s need to keep the information private 
and society’s (and the court’s) interest in ascertaining the truth.233 In creating 
the research scholar’s privilege, courts have recognized the privacy interest the 
researcher has in maintaining the research process. Further, such a privilege is 
reasonable when the public has yet to be exposed to the research itself.234 But 
when the research is published, these privacy interests supporting the research 
scholar’s privilege go away. 
Once the research article is published, a researcher can no longer claim the 
integrity of the research process to prevent disclosure. While researchers have 
a right to protect their research when performing the research, they no longer 
have that right once the research is published. By publishing their research, 
they have publicly invited public thought and comment on their study and its 
conclusions. One way to comment on a study is to challenge it, for it is by 
challenging and testing scientific conclusions that they become accepted by 
both scientists and society. Challenging the result in litigation is but one way 
this can happen, with one court saying “[a]n important element in determining 
the validity of . . . studies [used at trial] might sometimes require an 
opportunity to test the information used in the studies.”235 While researchers 
may prefer their research to be challenged by other academics, in an academic 
setting, the reality is once a researcher has published their research, they do not 
have a right to prevent the questioning of their work in a manner or method 
they do not approve of. However, one court has recognized the judicial process 
may not be the best avenue to challenge scientific research, saying: 
The validity of opinions formed and expressed in the context of disciplines 
other than the law should be tested by the relevant discipline’s requirements 
for validity or acceptability. This Court is unwilling to substitute the 
adversarial process of the judicial search for truth for the epistemological 
standards set by other disciplines.236 
Further, the courts would be dissuaded from expanding the privilege 
because the privilege already properly protects researchers. It protects 
researchers from outside parties interfering with their research, thus letting the 
researchers come to their own conclusions. As currently construed, the 
privilege allows researchers to publish studies free from any bias except their 
own. 
A cause for additional concern for the researcher is that the research 
scholar’s privilege is not absolute and does not forever end the discovery 
inquiry. Once the research study has been published, the court is then free to 
order the disclosure of the information previously granted protection by the 
 
 233. Catz & Lange, supra note 231, at 95–96. 
 234. See In re NCAA, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147174, at *7–8. 
 235. Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545, 1547 (11th Cir. 1985). 
 236. In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. 211, 215–16 (D. Ariz. 1987). 
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privilege.237 Such disclosure can still be subject to a protective order,238 but 
such a result must seem like a loss when the researcher spent so much time and 
effort challenging the order to begin with. 
B. Solution: Account for the Demand on the Researcher 
As promising as the research scholar’s privilege sounds, as currently 
applied, it is too narrow to protect the majority of researchers. Likewise, trying 
to expand the other arguments researchers have used to some success at 
defeating the subpoena (attorney-client privilege and journalist privilege) will 
fail because those situations are too unique and specific and unable to be 
generalized to researchers as a whole. In addition, confidentiality will also fail 
because its concerns are too easily accommodated with a protective order. 
At first, the simple solution to this problem regarding discovery of third 
party researcher’s underlying information would be to eliminate discovery 
from researchers in this situation. However, the Supreme Court has made clear 
such prohibition on discovery, and therefore the collection of evidence, would 
never be allowed in our judicial system.239 Further, the courts recognize the 
legitimate need of the parties in litigation to obtain this information for trial.240 
The party seeking discovery needs the information for its trial preparation and 
defense.241 These are very important interests and must not be unnecessarily 
infringed upon.242 Without access to the information, the party seeking 
discovery is unable to defend against the claims raised by an expert witness 
addressing a critical matter in the litigation.243 This information is necessary in 
order to perform a meaningful cross-examination of the expert witness.244 The 
party seeking discovery is entitled to cross examine the expert witness on the 
data underlying their opinions.245 Cross examination is a fundamental right of 
the judicial process and that right should never be restricted, except in the 
narrowest of circumstances to prevent its abuse.246 
A solution to this problem cannot be found in a court doctrine but needs to 
come from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The rules have already 
 
 237. In re NCAA, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147174, at *10–11. 
 238. Id. at *11. 
 239. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 
421, 438 (1932); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 668 (1972). 
 240. See Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 740 F.2d 556, 563 (7th Cir. 1984) (to 
properly prepare a defense, access to the underlying data to analyze its accuracy and methodology 
is absolutely essential). 
 241. Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545, 1547 (11th Cir. 1985). 
 242. Id. 
 243. Deitchman, 740 F.2d at 561. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. at 562 (citing Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 691 (1931)). 
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acknowledged once before the problem of subpoenas being used to compel the 
disclosure of evidence and information by un-retained experts and 
researchers.247 It is time they do so once again, but instead of only making 
alterations that result in superficial changes, the rules need to acknowledge the 
burden these lawsuits are placing on innocent third party researchers and give 
the researchers more consideration. By giving the researchers more 
consideration, the rules would be recognizing the undue hardship the 
researchers are facing from being subject to litigation while preserving the 
right for parties in a lawsuit to obtain evidence. Courts have continuously sung 
the praises of the public’s right to every man’s evidence248 but also recognize 
non-parties are entitled to special consideration when subject to a subpoena.249 
It is time courts start giving that special consideration to non-parties instead of 
just calling upon such consideration only when they see fit. 
The first way to give researchers more consideration in the litigation is the 
awarding of fees, both attorney fees and compensation for the information 
sought. By awarding attorney fees to the researcher, the rules are 
acknowledging the researcher is a third party to the litigation who, unlike 
traditional plaintiffs and defendants, has felt no injury or is subject to 
responsibility for that injury. The rules are recognizing the researcher is a 
completely detached third party who has no interest whatsoever to be subject 
to the demands and costs of litigation. Courts have already awarded attorney’s 
fees when the subpoena creates an undue burden and expense on the 
researcher,250 now it is time to recognize these discovery requests are 
inherently an undue burden on the researcher automatically deserving of 
attorney’s fees. The ability to award the researcher attorney’s fees gives the 
researcher some measure of confidence they have a right to challenge the 
discovery request and not be completely burdened by it. It gives the researcher 
a measure of security when being subjected to such an order. 
Further, the researcher should be compensated for the information they 
disclose. Unlike traditional evidence, the underlying information supporting 
the study sought by the discovering party is the intellectual property of the 
researcher. The researcher dedicated a significant amount of time and effort to 
collect the information for the purpose of their intellectual and academic 
research. The researchers have a significant amount of interest in this 
information, which should not be freely given to others. Society has already 
recognized this kind of information is entitled to compensation because expert 
witnesses, who use this kind of intellectual property at trial, get paid for their 
 
 247. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3)(B)(ii) advisory committee’s note to 1991 amendment. 
 248. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974). 
 249. Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 717 (1st Cir. 1998). 
 250. Ebert v. C.R. Bard, Inc., No. 1:13-MC-277, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48380, at *10 (M.D. 
Pa. Apr. 7, 2014). 
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knowledge and testimony. In addition, the comments to the 1991 amendments 
themselves indicate that one of the purposes of the changes was to see the 
researcher compensated251 but with no language directly present in the rule 
allowing for compensation, very few courts have ever given it.252 By granting 
the researcher compensation for their research, the court is acknowledging the 
interest the research has in the information and compensating the researcher for 
it. Such compensation lessens the burden felt by the researcher, prevents other 
parties from accessing the researchers’ data for free, and once again gives the 
researcher some measure of security when being subject to such an order. 
Therefore, to better acknowledge the researcher and their innocent third party 
status, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure need to be amended to allow these 
researchers to recover attorney’s fees and compensation for their research. 
Finally, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should also acknowledge the 
commitments and promises the researcher made in order to obtain their 
information and thus be amended to allow stronger protections of these 
promises. When the court compels the researcher to turn over the requested 
information, the court is favoring the conflict one set of citizens (the parties in 
the lawsuit) are having over the agreement another sets of citizens made (the 
researcher and the provider of the research data). Further, it appears the only 
reason the court is favoring the parties in the lawsuit is because they are in 
court. It is inherently unfair that an agreement between the researcher and the 
person who provide the researcher with information can be voided by the court 
simply because other parties are having a completely separate disagreement 
and, through the selection of their own experts, choose to tangentially involve 
the researcher’s work. Therefore, the rules should be amended to better protect 
these promises by researchers. 
 
 251. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3)(B)(ii) advisory committee’s note to 1991 amendment. 
 252. Of the following nine cases addressing this kind of researcher discovery and applying the 
1991 amendments, only one allowed compensation: In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & 
Likeness Licensing Litig., No. 4:12-mc-00508 JAR, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147174, at *10 (E.D. 
Mo. Oct. 12, 2012). The rest did not even mention it or determined it was not appropriate. In re 
Domestic Drywall Antitrust Litig., 300 F.R.D. 234, 238, 251 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (discussing when 
compensation should be given); Ebert v. C.R. Bard, Inc., No. 1:13-MC-277, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 48380, at *9, *11 (M.D. Penn. Apr. 7, 2014); Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Int’l Healthcare 
Worker Safety Ctr., No. 3:11-MC-28, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89402, at *1, *8 (W.D. Va. Aug. 
11, 2011); In re Bextra & Celebrex Mktg. Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., 249 F.R.D. 8, 13, 
15 (D. Mass. 2008); Weinman v. Cable, 427 F.3d 49, 52, 53 (1st Cir. 2005); Cable v. Weinman, 
233 F.R.D. 70, 76, 80 (D. Mass. 2006); Fanjoy v. Calico Brands, Inc., No. 2:06-mc-469 DB, 2006 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55158, at *6, 19–26 (D. Utah Aug. 7, 2006); Bluitt v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 
Co., No. 94-2318, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16933, at *4, *8 (E.D. La. Nov. 21, 1994). 
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CONCLUSION 
Independent researchers who publish conclusions resulting from their 
academic studies inherently recognize their conclusions will be viewed and 
relied upon by others. But one consequence they may not realize is when their 
report is used by an expert in litigation, this subjects the researcher to be open 
to discovery requests for the information supporting the report’s conclusions. 
Once the discovery request is made, the researcher has very little control. They 
are subjected to a balancing test, weighing the requesting parties need against 
whatever reasons the researcher can argue against discovery. The fact the 
researcher is a non-party to the case is only one factor benefiting the researcher 
but does not automatically dismiss the request.253 Other factors the researcher 
may claim are confidentiality, privilege, and undue burden, but the court will 
weigh these interests and attempt to create a protective order to still allow 
some measure of discovery.254 In order for the researcher to quash the 
discovery order, they must show overwhelming and convincing evidence that 
their interests outweigh those of the requesting party.255 This is not easy to do 
and as a result, researchers are often ordered to turn over their information to a 
certain extent. What limited protection is provided by the research scholar’s 
privilege, attorney client privilege, journalist privilege, and confidentiality are 
too circumstantial to properly protect researchers. While subjecting researchers 
to this discovery and litigation cannot be eliminated, the burden can be reduced 
by acknowledging the demand on the researcher, compensating them in the 
form of attorney’s fees and cost of research, and protecting the promises the 
researchers made to receive their information. Such changes must come from 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure but until they do, independent scientific 
researchers are at the mercy of litigation they have nothing to do with, only 
increasing the inherent tension between science and litigation. 
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